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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of
the State of Utah
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Appeal No. 14726

vs.
TERESA JEAN RAMOSELLI,
Defendant and Respondent.:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This Appeal by Salt Lake County arises out of a suit
commenced by it to condemn the property of the Respondent,
Teresa J. Rarnoselli (hereinafter called "Rarnoselli" or "Landowner") for a claimed public use.

The purported aegis of the

Complaint was the eminent domain laws of this State.
The issue of public necessity of the proposed

expropria~-

tion was contested by Ramoselli and framed, by the

pleadinqs~"

for trial before the District Court.

Said matter came on ffH'

hearing and determination on July 26, 1976.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
After two days of trial, the District Court found from
a fair preponderance of the evidence; that the County had not
made a showing of public necessity requisite to acquire the
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subject property by condemnation, that the testimony at trial
did not manifest that said property was needed as of March,
1974, or as of July, 1976, or in the foreseeable future, that
the county had no defined and adopted plans at all for the use
of said property, that the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
county had not approved or adopted any plans for the utilization of the condemned premises, that only the most preliminary
drawings as to possible and future uses had been recently made,
that no funds had been budgeted for the use of the Ramoselli
property aDd there was no showing that funds could be obtained,
at all, from any source for a possible future use, that the
evidence manifested a lack of any plans of the County to place
the Ramoselli property to any general or specific use at any
defined point in the future; and that under the evidence, the
proposed use by Salt Lake County of the subject property was
"uncertain, indefinite and speculative".

(R.34-38)

The trial Court found and concluded that the attempt to
condemn the Ramoselli property by the County was plainly and
palpably unreasonable and constituted a clear abuse of legislative discretion.

(R.37)

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and an Order dismissing the case were entered by the
District Court on July 29, 1976.

From that Order of Dismissal,

the County prosecutes this Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY COUNTY ON APPEAL
The County requests of this court that it not only reverse
the District court on the question of public necessity, but
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that this Court find, as a matter of fact and law, that public
necessity for condemnation of the Ramoselli land existed in
March of 1974.
The County seeks remand of the Case for trial on the
issue of Just Compensation, assuming arguendo, that the
question of public necessity has been resolved in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the Brief of the County is
not inaccurate; it is simply incomplete.

Such Statement is

a general recital of the proceedings of trial without any
account of the evidentiary facts presented to and admitted by
the trial Court. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) of
the Appellate Rules of the Court, the following statement of
the facts underlying the decision of the lower Court is made:
l.

General Description.
The property of the Landowner herein consisted of some

11 acres, having its situs at 6600 South and 9th East in
Salt Lake County.

On March 8, 1974, the County filed suit

to condemn said property, the alleged public use 'being a
park and recreation area.

(R.5)

Ramoselli answered the

county Complaint denying that there existed the essential
necessity for the condemnation acquisition and alleging:
(a)

that there was no defined use to which the property
was to be placed that had been approved or adopted
by the governing Board of County Commissioners;
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(b)

that there was no need for the condemned property
by the County in the immediately foreseeable future;

(c)

that the proposed use of the land by the County was
speculative and conjectural;

(d)

that there was no reasonable funding for any contemplated use of the Ramoselli property, now or in
the future;

(e)

that the possible use of the land by the County did
not square with the requirements that the proposed
use, if any, be so designed as to comport with the
vreatest public good and the least private injury.

2.

P!f T

as

Gil

Planned Use of Property.

of llarch 1974, no plans of any defined character relat-

ing ta the possible use of the subject property as a public
par:k had been submitted to and approved by Salt Lake County.

(R.111)
197'~

For that matter, even as of the date of trial in July

no defined plans had been adopted or approved by the

County.

(R.112)

Moreover, the Parks Department, itself, had not approved
or adopted any plans for the particular use of the Ramoselli
property as of March 1974, or as of the date of trial.

Barely

18 days before the Case was tried, a preliminary sketch (Exhibit
P-16) was placed in the hands of the staff of the Parks Department, showing a tentative use of the condemned land.

!I

(R.153)

Such sketch had only been reviewed by staff and non-policy

!/

The sketch shows the prospect of a tennis court or two, a parking
area, walking paths, retention of the present house of Ramoselli
in which Mrs. Ramoselli and her family presently live and other
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney
Law uses.
Library. Funding
for digitization
the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
similar
possible
The trial
Courtprovided
foundbysuch
tentative
Library
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
drawing to
be Services
ill-defined,
unadopted
and conjectural.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

personnel of the Parks Department and had not even been seen or
reviewed· by the County Parks and Recreation Commission, much
less the County Commission.
3.

(R.155)

Evidence on Time Frame of Possible Use
There was no testimony that the County had established a

time in which the condemned property was to be put to some park
use.

Indeed, the County did not know when, if ever in the

future, the property of Ramoselli would be put to a .park use.
(R.162,163) The Wheeler property to the north and east had heen
acquired through voluntary acquisition by the Parks Department
in 1970 for an intended public, historical use, but as of eix
years later, in July of 1976, said property had yet to be
to its intended purpose.

(R.85-88)

plao~

The Court was without any

testimony that the County had any intention to put the subject
property to any use at any time, immediately or in the
foreseeable or unforeseeable.
4.

future~

(R.163)

Funding for the Possible Use.
As of March 1974 as well as of the date of trial, tk&re were

no funds budgeted, appropriated, existent or otherwise a"¥ailable from whatever source (public or private) to 'place the

coa-

demned property to any present or future use by the CoWl"'Y• ,.~
(R.161)

While the budget of the County Parks Department had .~

been substantially cut in recent years and there was no reasOR
to believe that a change would take place in Park financing in
the future (R. 165-166), the Parks Commission was hopeful that
·
d through posa use of the condemned property coul d b e f inance
sible grants from such sources as federal agencies, conservation
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funds, community development, Housing & Urban Development (HUD),
and historic funds.

(R.150)

No applications had ever been

made for such grants and no commitments had been received
from any source at any time for the funding of any use of
tb.e subject land.

(R.162)

The Board of County Commissioners

had never given

approval for the expenditure of any sum for a park or recreational use of the Ramoselli property by the County (R.163)
and whether it would or would not do so in the future was

Clllll!11'•l7 aakaown. Thus it was under the testimony of

c. c.

Baugh, Administrator of County Parks:
Q

And that in turn depends upon the availability
of funds?

A

Yes.

Q

Is that correct? And that in turn depends upon
the action of the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners which at this time is unknown to
you?

A

That is right.

Q

Isn't that true?

A

Yes.

The County had hoped to obtain capital funds for park
purposes through the issuance of recreational bonds in 1974.
However, the bond issue was placed before the electorate and
rejected in that year.
5.

(R.160)

The Wheeler Historical Farm.
It was claimed by the County that the subject property

was eventually to be made a part of what is ref erred to as the
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Wheeler Historical Farm.

Such is not considered a park or

recreational use, but rather one of historical significance.
(R.63,86)

Seventy-five acres of property with frontage on both

6600 South and 900 East had already been acquired through
voluntary measures by the County in 1970.

(R.85,86)

No use

had been made of any consequence for historical or recreational
purposes on the 75 acres.

In fact, it was not until 1976 that

even marginal use was made of the Wheeler Farm.

(R.160)

It

had been leased by the County for several years to private
interests.
That the Ramoselli property might be, in part, some day
used in connection with the Wheeler Historical Farm was not
even considered by County staff and non-policy personnel until
1974 after the filing of the condemnation suit herein.

(R.111)

No plans for the subject property to be used in connection with
the so-called Wheeler Historical Farm had ever been presented
to or approved by the County Commission.

(R.111)

The staff of

county Parks Commission had never developed any design criteria
to determine whether the Ramoselli property was' necessary to
the use and operation of the Wheeler Farm theory.
6.

(R.103,104)

General Maps of Salt Lake Valley.
At trial, the County offered several maps suggesting a

guide for land use patterns and development throughout the
greater Salt Lake Valley.

They were:

(i) The county Big Cottonwood District Development Plan (Exhibit 6-P) was approved in form by the
county Commission in August of 1973.

It, like the
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other master plans, did not delineate the Ramoselli
property to be placed to a specific use nor was the
subject property described in any way by metes and
bounds.

In addition, there was no time frame suggested

in such planning guide for any development of the
.Ramoselli property at any time.
Commissioner Dunn stated the position of the
Coaunission as to the purpose of the Cottonwood Development at the time of its adoption by the County Commission:
"Commissioner Dunn stated that as he has gone
tarough this plan, he thinks it is important
t:lliat the public, as well as the Commissioners,
.....,. an understandin here that the ado tion
is plan isn't necessarily the implementation
Of this plan. It sets forth a goal by which
certain things can be accomplished if the plan
is followed, and the metes and bounds that are
silown in some of these areas as relating to
green areas, or golf courses or parks or schools,
etc. may· or may not eventually come about; it
merely points out a point if they were to have
their choice of going out and doing everything,
this is the way they essentially would be done,
but not necessarily the way it might be ultillllltely done. It is important that the adoption
of this plan, the basic concept the County
Commission would be taken would be to approve
the concept here, but with neither the means or
ability to necessan.ly implement all of the
1rograms that are there." (Emphasis added.)
Exhibit 7-P, p.2)
(ii) The 1985 Master Plan of Salt Lake County (Exhibit
2-P).

The plan was designed in 1965 and under a color

code, reflected general land use concepts.

(R. 79)

The

Exhibit had nothing to do with the metes and bounds of the
subject property for particular County use, but rather was
to serve as a guide for the County Planning and Zoning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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Commission.

(R.79)

There had been substantial departures

from the guideline of Exhibit 2-P in the actual use of
land throughout the County since its adoption in 1965.
(R. 80)

(iii) The County Recreation and Parks Master Plan of
1972 (Exhibit 4-P) was a general study containing recommendations regarding property use.

It did

it was not intended to portray the subject

...

Ramoselli by metes and bounds (R.82), and did not de-

,.::;

lineate any use of said property or at any
in the future.

parti0'1ll~

It was of the same lineage as the 1!!9'5

Master Plan for Salt Lake Valley--a guidepost f~~
.

and more detailed, intensified study.
7.

'<

'•.:; .tr'; .....

""i.Ji.

- ' ti

(R.52)

County Park Procedure.
It was the position of the County that in the

of property for parks, it did not normally develop
particularized plans for the use of
establish a time of usage until the property was
acquired.

(R.149)

It was claimed that it would

time and effort to lay-out plans for particular use of
erty until that property had been actually purchased.
Such was the accustomed procedure, at least, when the
Parks Commission was involved in a voluntary acquisition of
property.

(R.85,86)
FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The District court, found, upon the close of the evidence
and argument that a specific use of the Ramoselli property was
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not and still had not been defined by the Board of County
commissioners, that there was no showing of any intended use of
the property for any intended purpose in the immediately foreseeable future, that the County had not shown that it was
financially capable of placing the property to any park or
recreational use, that its drawings were of a preliminary
nature only and related to possible and future uses which were
unapproved by the Parks and Recreation Department and the Board
of county Commissioners, and that the use by Salt Lake County
of the Ramoselli premises was uncertain, indefinite, and
speculative. (R.37)

It found that there was no showing of

public need of the condemned property in the reasonably foreseeable future and that under the evidence, the attempted
condemnation was plainly and palpably unreasonable and constituted a "clear abuse of legislative discretion".
An

(R.37)

Order of Dismissal of the Case was thereupon entered by

the trial Court on July 29, 1976.
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A R G U ME N T
POINT I.
THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC NECESSITY IS PLAINLY
JUSTICIABLE IN THIS CASE AND THE COUNTY MUST
AND DID FAIL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO CONDEMN THE
RAMOSELLI PROPERTY WHERE THE EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC
NECESSITY HAVE NOT BEEN MET.
1.

The Issue of Public Need is Properly Before this court.
The law of this jurisdiction has long stood for the propo-

sition that whether an attempted expropriation of private land
by a political subdivision of government is accompanied by a
showing of public necessity, is a justiciable question properly
before the Court. Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching
Co., 18 U.2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966); Bertagnole, et al v.
Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (1950); Tanner v. Provo
Bench Canal Irr. Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); Utah
Copper Co. v. Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 64 Utah
423, 255 Pac. 672 (1927).

All of the factors t~at go into the

make-up of public need of the condemnation acquisition may be
raised by the Landowner before the Court in defense against the
acquisition.
The position of the County, in Point II of its Brief,
augers against such legal precept.

Therein, it contends that

a resolution of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to condemn the property of this Landowner is all but dispositi ve of every issue, except the amount of compensation to be
paid for the expropriation , and that the presumption of the
regularity and appropriateness of the taking, once determined
by the condemner, places the issue of necessity beyond the
factual reach of the condemnee.

The County relies upon a

u. s.

Supreme Court decision and the Treatise, Nichols on Eminent
Domain, for such claim (see page 8 of its Brief).
The County is misled in its contention.
decision of the

u.

To begin with, a

S. Supreme Court on the federal substantive

law of eminent domain has no sphere of influence before this
Court in this Case; federal eminent domain proceedings have a
setting that are legally and factually distinct and inapposite
to the statutory process of condemnation extant in the State of
Utah.

Moreover, while we have no quarrel with the observation

quoted from Nichols that judicial review on the question of
public need is directed to particular aspects of the administrative decision by the public agency to condemn, the quotation in the County's Brief ignores the more definitive
statement in Nichols under the same paragraph that:
"In every case, therefore, there is a judicial question whether the taking is of such a
nature that it is or may be founded on a public
necessity." l Nichols on Eminent Domain, §4.11
[2) p. 4-157.
The fact is that the County, in the case at hand, is confronted with a statute that confers upon District Court jurisdiction to ultimately resolve the question of public necessity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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when that matter is placed in issue.

78-34-4 U.C.A. of the

Eminent Domain Code declares, in part:
"Conditions precedent to taking - before
property can be taken it must appear:

* * *

(2) That the taking is necessary to such

* * *. "

(Emphasis added)

Furthermore, 78-34-5, u.c.A. 1953 charges that when
property is taken for public use, the project "must be
located in a manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury".

Such

statutory provisos, although not cited by the County in its
Brief, are not a mere penmanship exercise or an abstract
vacuum without meaning.

Rather, such legislation bestows

upon the judiciary the full throat to determine whether an
attempted condemnation expropriation is buttressed by public
need.

Such issue, accordingly, had proper standing before

the District Court in this Case.
2.

The Elementary Factors of Public Necessity.
The lower Court proceeded in this Case on the premise that

the Resolution (Exhibit 1-P) of the County to condemn the
Ramoselli property was presumptively valid and that such
determination would not be set aside unless the evidence
manifested fraud, bad faith, or a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the condemning agency.

(R.49) That axiom is in

accord with the controlling case precedent in this jurisdiction, Ogden City v. Stephens, 21 U.2d 336, 445 P.2d 703
(1968), and was unremarkable.

The principle was never the
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subject of contest on the part of Ramoselli herein; indeed, the
Landowner supported the concept.
Ramoselli made no claim in this Cause that the condemnation suit was spawned on the winds of fraud or bad faith.
Rather, the position of this Landowner was fastened to the
precept that the attempted condemnation of the subject property
by the County in this Proceeding was so fraught with conjecture
and speculation as to planning and time of use and so afflicted
by the lack of any rational basis that park use of the Ramoselli
land wotild ever be realized, that fair minded men could only

conclude tlwlt the County had manifestly abused its discretion
in instituting this action.
There are several criteria which, at a minimum, must be
met by the condemning body to satisfy the test of public need.
To begin with, the principle for the use of the property must

be spelled out by the condemner with specificity.
Helena v. Dewolf, 508 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1973).

City of

That is not to

say that every square foot of the proposed project must be
2/
designed and described with infinite precision.- But it does
mean that the condemning body cannot, as it did in this Case,
walk into the courtroom with a cavalier sketch, (Exhibit P-16)
of a possible use of a citizen's property which had been

~

However, as generally noticed through hundreds of condemnation suits
brought in this State, many of which have been before this Honorable
Court, in practically every suit (whether for highway, school, or
reservoir purposes) the project use has been designed and redesigned
over several years with great care and detail, encompassing right-ofway drawings, engineering plans, and working drawings, as well as
specifications.
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prepared bearly 18 days before the time of trial, which had not
been reviewed much less approved by the County Parks Commission, and which had not been seen, approved, or adopted, even
in concept, by the governing Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake County.

How, we would query, is the County to determine

whether the property of Rarnoselli is needed for the public use
until reasonably defined plans are developed, reviewed, approved,
and adopted, which dictate that need? The question provides its
own answer.
Secondly, there must be a showing that the property of
the Landowner is required for the public use at the time of
condemnation or at the latest, in the reasonably irnrnediate
future. Necessity, by inherent definition, implies a known and
defined date of usage.

The overwhelming body of case law,

uncontroverted by the County in its Brief, is to the effect
that the governmental body is bound to show a need of the condemned property of either present or near future proportions,
as a condition precedent to the expropriation.
Board v. Pratt, 250 A.2d 726 (Vt. 1969).

State Biqhway

As stated by the

Supreme Court of Michigan in Board of Education v. Baczewski,
340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810:
"In condemnation proceedings in this State
petitioner should prove that the property will
either be immediately used for the purP<;>se.for
which it is sought to be condemned or within a
period of time that the jury determines to be
the near future or a reasonably immediate use."
(Emphasis added) •
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Nichols, in his work on Eminent Domain, describes an
attempt to condemn property for a use, the time of which
is open and undefined, as naked "speculation and conjecture"
and cannot be sustained.
p. 4-211 (3rd Ed.).

1 Nichols

~Eminent

Domain, §4.11,

Necessity in eminent domain, is that

which exists "now or in the near future".

Nichols on

Eminent Domain, Ibid.
Thirdly, a showing is required that the proposed use is
reasonably capable of being realized and if the evidence
re!!!J.• that there is no economic basis for funding of the
prcpiwei• uae, the condemnation complaint must fail.

Winegar,

School Board, et al v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A.2d 521 (1952).
In fiDdiDg that public necessity did not exist under a
Montana statute similar to that of 78-34-4(2) U.C.A., the
Montana Supreme Court stated in City of Helena v. Dewolf,
supra:
"The burden of demonstrating necessity rests
upon the condemnor who must establish a prima
facie case to justify the taking. * * *
"We conclude that 'necessity' must be
shown as a reasonable need with foreseeable
ability to complete. Under the facts of
this case we do not find a showing of reasonably foreseeable ability to complete. Defendants' going business would be destroyed, the
property acquired, and simply held for that
indefinite future when it just might be needed.
* * *." (Emphasis ours)
We do not argue that the County is under a mandate to
show that its pockets are laden with coin of the realm so as
to instantaneously bankroll all facets of the proposed use
herein.

But it was submitted to the trial Court and we do
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maintain that there must be some plausible manifestation that
the proposed use is susceptible of capital funding from a
known source at the time of condemnation or in the reasonably
immediate future.

Elsewise, the whole system of property

rights in this country, so fundamental to the entire social
order, would be open game for the ambitious and future schemes
of a government empire building.

The Government is proscribed

from engaging in land "speculation" by the narrow and strictly
construed power to condemn a citizen's property.

Moyle, et al

v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947);
Bertagnole, et al v. Baker, supra.

POINT II.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF EVIDENCING PUBLIC
NECESSITY TO WARRANT THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN RESTS WITH THE CONDEMNOR,
SALT LAKE COUNTY.
This Court is committed to the proposition that the
burden of proving public necessity in condemnation rests with
that party who seeks to exercise the power.

In Tanner v.

Provo Bench Canal & Irr. co., supra, this Court, writing
through Frick, c. J., stated the rule to be:
"The burden of showing necessity and public
use is upon petitioner. The burden showing th~ 11
damages which the owner will suffer rests on him.
See also Monetaire Mining co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol.
Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 Pac. 172 (1918)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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we would not debate the concept that the resolution of
condemnation adopted by the public agency creates, in most
circumstances, an evidentiary presumption in favor of the
power to condemn.

But that presumption is rebuttable, and

when rebutted by competent evidence to the contrary on the
issue of public necessity (as was the occasion in the Case
at hand), the power to condemn is jeopardized if the condemning body does not fulfill it burden of proof on the issue of
public necessity as defined by law.
'file failing of the County herein to demonstrate, under
the requisite principles of public necessity as set out in

Point I of this Brief, public necessity for the Ramoselli
property presently or in the immediate foreseeable future,
required that the District Court dismiss the Complaint herein.

Such dismissal was entered and is to be affirmed on

review.

POINT III.
THE COUNTY FAILED TO MANIFEST AT TRIAL
ANY DEFINED USE OF THE RAMOSELLI PROPERTY
PRESENTLY OR IN THE REASONABLY IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
It does not take a divining rod to ascertain the basis
of the Findings of the lower Court that the Complaint of the
County be dismissed for failure to show public need of the
Ramoselli property.

The insipid and ephemeral evidence

submitted on the question by the Plaintiff made the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-18Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conclusion inescapable that the statutory mandate and decisional
precedent of this Jurisdiction on public necessity had not
been proven.

It was not even a close call.

First, as to any plans for a proposed use of the condemned
property, the short and simple answer is that there were no
plans.

The best shot of the County in that regard was in

the form of Exhibit 16-P.

While the property was being tested

as of the date of condemnation in March of 1974, 16-P was
prepared barely two weeks before the date of trial in late
July of 1976.

The Exhibit had only been seen by staff and

non-policy personnel of the Parks Commission.

No one in a

policy position even at Parks Commision level had given approval to it.

The governing Board of County Commissioners

knew nothing of it, whatsoever, and
never been approved or adopted.

~

fortiori, 16-P had

It was admitted in evidence

as a "preliminary sketch" of a possible use of the Rarnoselli
property for park purposes.

A casual survey of 16-P prompts

the conclusion that the drawing could have been constructed
by an ordinary layman inside of an hour.

The Exhibit does

not begin to rise to the quantum and quality of proof so
essential to an ascertainment of public need.
But the disease in the County's case did not stop there.
It is uncontested that even were it assumed, for the sheer
sake of argument, the existence of a defined and reasonably
articulated plans for park use of the Rarnoselli property,
the County had no notion, at all, as to the time when any
possible use would be realized.

It was not a question of
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the use being in the future of 2 years or of the remote
future of 5, 10, or 25 years, it was, rather, the evidence
before the trial Court that there was no time established at
all.

It is not surprising that under that set of facts, the

District Court found that any use of the subject property by
the county was idle speculation and conjecture.
The lack of a funding source to achieve any possible
use of the condemned property, whether that use be speculative or real, was the final flaw in the County's position
before tbe trial Court.

This was not a case that the capital

funding, while not available eo instanti, would be forthcoming
from the County Co11UI1ission in due course.

It was not even a

case that the capital funding would be available from the
County Commission in the distant or remote future.

Rather,

the testimony before the trial Court was that there were no
monies available at all, that the budgets of the County
Parks Commission had been cut in recent years and the Parks
Department would have to embark upon a search for possible
federal grant funds or private, philanthropic donations to
underwrite any park use of the Ramoselli property.

The

issue of adequate capital funding, standing alone, might not
be sufficient to deny in every instance, the entitlement to
condemn herein.

But taken with the plethora of testimony

herein on the lack of any defined use along with the absence
of any time of usage, the evidence on the total void of funding merely confirmed the fact that the attempt to acquire
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-20Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Ramoselli property by condemnation was nothing more than
fanciful speculation by the County and was destined to
failure.
1.

Other Maps and Master Plans Introduced by the county.
In an attempt to avert the shortfall of the County's

position on public need in this case, it introduced three
general master plans of Salt Lake County, or parts thereof.
Such drawings provided no panacea whatsoever to avoid the
result reached by the lower Court.

The 1985 plan of Salt

Lake Valley (Exhibit 2-P) and the County Parks Master Plan
of 1972 (Exhibit 4-P) were admitted as nothing more than a
general guide-on to further, future, and more particularized,
specific planning. Those generalized drawings are theoretical in character only and are without weight in the decisional process of public necessity in this Case.

The County

cannot, in this Proceeding, brace itself on the element of
public need by using a 1985 and 1972 conceptual plans for
Salt Lake Valley as a crutch.

The County cites no case

precedent in which such general, theoretical concepts have
ever formed the basis to condemn specific property.
The same fate is in store for Exhibit 6-P, offered by
the County as the Big Cottonwood District Development Plan.
It, too, was a guide for future consideration of more particularized planning and in no way cures the defect in the
showing of public need herein.

County Commissioner,

Dunn, in Exhibit 7-P, stated on the record, when the concept of 6-P was adopted, that such adoption was not "the
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implementation" of the Plan, but merely "set forth a goal
***if the plan is followed", and that the areas relating
to "golf courses, or parks or schools, etc., may or may not
eventually come about".

Commissioner Dunn concluded with a

statement that such a plan as 6-P was conceptual only and
that the County had "neither the means nor the availability
to necessarily implement all of the programs" therein.
The theoretical Master Plan concepts were unentitled to
any weight in the decisional process on the question of
public necessity to condemn the particular property of

Raee8eJli llerein.
2.

Claimed Procedure for Land Acqt:,isition by the County
Parks Commission.
~be

County attempted to justify the absence of any

reasonably defined plans for the possible use of the Ramoselli
property presently or in the immediate foreseeable future,
on the lament that the normal operating procedure of the
Parks Commission is to first acquire property and then
prepare plans for its ensuing utilization.

It claims that

adequately defined plans, target date for use, and funding
sources would be futile until the Parks Commission was
assured that the property was secure.

With regard to the

wisdom (or lack thereof) of Park Commission procedure in
acquiring, by voluntary purchase, private property and only
then laying plans for the use of such voluntarily acquired
property, we make no comment.

But as to that property which
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the County seeks to acquire involuntarily by force of the
eminent domain power, the answer is swift.

The County is

unentitled to condemn the property of a citizen and thereafter to sit in the councils of government and decide how,
when, and if that property is to be used.

Such conduct, as

evidenced in this Cause, is nothing short of rank land
speculation, is the antithesis of the fundamental system of
property rights in this Country, and constitutes a clear
abuse of discretion on the part of the Plaintiff herein.

No

other public agency of Government has been heard or forced
to make such an argument before this Court.

POINT IV
THE COUNTY PARKS COMMISSION IS UNENTITLED
TO CONDEMN PROPERTY FOR A USE IN THE
UNDEFINED FUTURE.
The County is heard to contend in Point IV of its
Brief, p. 17, that the Parks Commission of Salt Lake County
is entitled to condemn property for future use. ,Cases are
cited from other jurisdictions suggesting that the property
may be acquired for future use up to 15 or 20 years from the
date of taking.

However, no decisions of this Court are

cited for such a sweeping proposition; ~ndeed, that is not
the law of the case in this State, either by decision or
statute.
-23-
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78-34-4(2) u.c.A. is the litmus test for public need
and that, as shown by the overwhelming weight of authority,
requires a showing of use at the present or in the immediate
foreseeable future.

(See authorities and discussion set out

in Point I, page 11 of this Brief).
The County has no inherent power to condemn a citizen's
property.

The genesis of its authority to so do is one of

plenary delegation from the Sovereign, and that delegation
is strictly and narrowly construed against the political
subdivision.

Bertagnole, et al v. Baker,

supra~

Moyle v.

Salt Lake City, supra.
The acquisition of private property for a future use
being one of legislative delegation, the only agency which
has been granted the authority by the Utah Legislature to
condemn for a future purpose is the State Road Commission
(now the Utah Department of Transportation).

Under 27-11-9

U.C.A. 1963, the State Road Commission is authorized:
"to acquire any real property or interest
therein deemed necessary for temporary,
present, or reasonable future state highway purpose by * * * condemnation * * *·"
(Emphasis added).
There has been and is no parallel or companion legislation
authorizing Salt Lake County to condemn for park usage in
the "reasonable future" much the less the undefined future
(under the evidence of this case) and the County has not
referred this Court to any such Statute in its Brief.

The

argument of Salt Lake County on this score thus falls of its
own weight.
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POINT V.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE AND WILL NOT BE OVERTURNED BY THIS
COURT ON APPELLATE REVIEW.
The Findings, Conclusions, and Order of the District
Court in this matter are presumptively correct and so long
as there is competent evidence to sustain the same, those
Findings and Order will not be overturned on appeal.

Schluter

v. Summit County and Town of Kamas, 25 U.2d 257, 480 P.2d
140 (1971); Petty v. Gindy Mfg., Corp., 17 U.2d 32, 404 P.2d
30 (1965); Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1952).
Such rule of appellate review is so well accepted in the
decisions of this Court that citations of authority become
unnecessary.
Yet it is the position of the County that the Court, in
this appeal, should reverse the District Court on the facts,
enter Findings of its own on the question of public necessity,
and then remand the case to the lower Court for a' determination of Just Compensation.

Not only does such argument

ignore the heavy weight of the decisional precedent of this
Court as to its function in the appellate process, it also
ignores the constitutional and statutory mandate that this
Court will not sit as the trier of fact and overturn the
Findings of the court of original jurisdiction where they
are based upon competent evidence.

Article VIII, Section 9,
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Utah state Constitution; 78-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended.

The

Findings, Conclusion, and Order of Dismissal of the District
court, are supported by competent and substantial evidence,
and should be affirmed herein.

C 0 N C L U S I 0 N

The appeal of the County must fail.

The District

court, upon receipt of all of the evidence, expressly entered
Filldi.nt9 of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the County, in
its attempt to condemn the property of Ramoselli, had clearly
abaaell its discretion.

That determination·was bottomed upon

the f1!1rther findings that the County had failed to approve
and adopt reasonably defined plans for the use of the subject
property, that only a preliminary sketch for a possible use
had been submitted to the staff of the County Parks Commission, that the time for use was plainly undefined, speculative, and conjectural and that the County had not manifested
that it was capable of obtaining capital funding for any use
of the Ramoselli property at any time in the future.

Under

the attendant facts of this Case, a result other than that
of the trial Court would have invited open and unharnessed
land speculation by the County Parks Commission.
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The Findings, Conclusions, and Order of Dismissal, are
supported by competent and substantial evidence and should
be affirmed in this review.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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